Bluffing in Heads Up Sit-N-Gos: The Value in Storytelling

10:30pm: You hear it all the time: be aggressive. Aggression, aggression, aggression is supposed to be the key to winning poker, right? No doubt there’s some truth to that. So what makes you or anyone an aggressive player? Are you classified as an aggressive player if you bluff a lot? To answer this question, let’s backtrack and define the different types of aggression. There are two forms: (a) wreckless and (b) well timed.

Wreckless aggression is pretty much an illogical, alpha-male sort of aggression for those with bigger egos than IQs. People who are wrecklessly aggressive bluff in spots where:

  • There is no value in doing so.
  • Fold equity doesn’t justify the push
  • Their table image has been established such that the whole purpose of bluffing has been negated
  • They have no regard for the range of cards they will get called with in spots they choose to push

On the other hand, well timed aggression is aggression that is completely deliberate and well thought out. If bluffing is “madness” then well timed aggression is definitely the method behind the madness. Well timed aggression may consist of times where:

  • The estimated odds of your opponent folding offset the smaller chance you will get called
  • You have established a level of trust with your opponent such that the move is well disguised
  • The board is such that your opponent has more cards that could beat them than cards that cannot
  • Your opponent cannot logically call without one or two exact cards in their hand

Either way, obviously the result we are trying to acheive is to get our opponent to fold, which is why we call this technique bluffing. We don’t have a hand, and we would like to win the pot without having to show our cards.

Now that we’ve established the two kinds of aggression (that consequently lead to bluffing), let’s decide which kind is a more suitable choice for the winning heads up sit n go player. While I award brownie points for courage for those who practice wreckless aggression, the path to true heads up sng success is paved with well timed aggression. There are simply times when it makes absolutely no sense to bluff. Let’s examine these times:

  • In the 10/20 blinds, and you only have 20 invested in the pot. Your opponent has bet the pot, and you have absolutely nothing. Let it go, there is no value in protecting what little you have in the pot at this point. Wait until the blinds mean something to start stealing.
  • When you suspect that your opponent has caught on to the fact that you’ve been stealing quite a few pots. The more pots you drag, even if they are small, the more likely you are going to be forced at some point to prove you’ve got the goods. People catch on. This is why I suggest waiting until later to start firing with air, because establishing a tight image early on is worth more later on when the blinds actually hurt to lose.
  • When you’ve just shown a bluff. I can’t tell you how many times I see people show a bluff, and then try the same move again no more than 10 seconds later. I’m well aware that some people would think that I would think that there’s no way someone would do it twice in a row without having the goods, therefore I might give them the benefit of the doubt and fold the second time. Problem with that thinking is that most people aren’t on that 2nd-3rd level of thinking, and will simply call you the next time you bet big — as they should, because you have betrayed their trust.
  • When pride is starting to get in the way. We’ve seen this situation before: you’re trying to bluff someone, and they keep calling you with bottom pair — and frankly, it’s pissing you off. First off, STOP. This is not about pride, or bragging rights, or who’s got the biggest kahunas. This is about money, and it’s clear that your opponent doesn’t trust you. To counter balance this, you should probably take him to a place I like to call “value city”. It’s nice up there.
  • When the risk/reward ratio is too low. Way too often, I see people fire 400 on the river into a pot with 80 chips in it, I fold, and then they show me 9 3 offsuit. Ok, so what? You risked 400 chips to get 40 of your own back? Even if I fold 9 times out of 10, that’s only a net profit of [40 x 9] = 360 chips. The one time you get called you lose 440 chips. Does that sound like a winning proposition to you? I would sure hope not.

After everything I’ve just presented you with, the main thing you need to know is that wreckless aggression is -EV, while well timed aggression is +EV. There has to be some kind of deliberacy within your system of bluffing for it to be effective. Just because something is deliberate and premeditated doesn’t mean it is dechipherable. The trick to effective bluffing is coming up with your own undechiperable method of aggression.

The key to successful bluffing is to be a good storyteller, because when you bluff, you are attempting to tell a story — even if false. The story has to be believable, or else the whole purpose of such a move is null and void. When your opponent is faced with a tough call in the later stages of the hand, they will probably try to piece together the fragments of the story to see if everything “fits”, and then come to a conclusion on whether or not your story is believable to them. Wreckless aggression and well timed aggression aside, there is a such thing as a good bluff and a bad bluff. Let’s try to pick them apart.

  • The bad: You’ve played pretty tight the whole match. Whenever you’ve raised, you usually held two cards 10 or higher (KQ, AK, QJ, etc), and your opponent knows this. This time you’ve raised to 90 (from 30) preflop with AsKd - and the flop comes: 5d 6c 9h. You make a pot-sized continuation bet, and your opponent calls. The pot is now 540.The turn is 7h. Your opponent checks to you, and you decide to check behind, hoping to hit one of your overcards. The river is a total brick: 2s, and your opponent once again checks to you.

    Being perfectly honest with yourself, you’re probably a little upset that you have so much money invested in this pot with such a premium hand, and you’ve totally missed the board. You’re almost 100% sure you’re beat but you feel your opponent can’t call unless they hold an 8, so you decide that you want to throw a temper tantrum (because you missed) and steal this pot by betting 500 on the river. You do so, and your opponent goes into the tank.It is at this moment that your opponent is piecing together the story you have just told them to see if it makes any sense. Every time you’ve raised preflop, you’ve held two high cards. Therefore, there’s really no scenario with you raising preflop that involves you holding an 8 in your hand, unless you raised with 88, but that’s not entirely likely. You checked the turn when the straight hit the board, which means that you were either scared of the card, or you totally loved it. If you had an overpair, you would have probably bet the turn to see where you were at with the intention of folding to a raise.

    In addition to this, if you had an overpair, the river bet is entirely too large for this holding to make sense. With an overpair, you would want a call. 500 screams, “please don’t call me”. Therefore, a logical mindset would deduce that you’d either have the straight or nothing at all in this spot.Given your normal preflop raising range, and your betting patterns on this board, it now starts to make sense that the story you are trying to tell is false. Your opponent calls with A9, and you were caught in a fairly non well-thought-out bluff.

  • The good: Good bluffs involve manipulating “sure fire” information. That is, the rare times when you are able to put your opponent on a VERY specific range of hands. This will enable you to represent cards that you know are scary for your opponents hand. For example, as stated before in one of my articles (on Tells, I believe) most opponents who raise 4x preflop are holding mid pocket pairs almost all day. Your opponent believes you to be a relatively loose player, but knows that your calling range is a lot more narrow than your raising range. Therefore, when they make a 4x raise preflop and you call, it is reasonable to assume that they are thinking that you are holding overcards to their middle pair preflop.Let’s say that your opponent makes it 80 to go in the 10/20 blinds preflop on the button, and you call not even looking at your cards. In fact, it would be a good exercise in this hand to stick a post it note on where your cards are just to emphasize that cards aren’t as important as the storytelling is.

    The pot is now 160, and the flop comes 2c 3c 9s. You believe your opponent to be holding 44-88. They make a bet of half the pot (80 - which, by the way screams “I’m leaving myself room to fold this weak hand”), and you decide to call with the intention of bluffing the turn if (a) the flush completes or (b) an overcard hits. The pot is now 320, which means you have 160 chips invested into the hand.

    The turn is an excellent card to pull this move off (Kc). Your opponent bets half the pot once again (160), but this time, you decide to raise and represent either/or the club or the king. You decide to raise to 460, making it another 300 to call for your opponent. Once again, as we discussed before, this is the moment where your opponent goes into the tank and pieces together the story. Here are some of the facts that add up to your raising seeming truthful:

    1. You are sure your opponent perceives you as tight, and you called a 4x raise preflop

    2. You just called the flop, which is often what someone with overcards and more frequently, a flush draw would do.

    3. Your opponent doesn’t know that you know that their 4x raise means “middle pocket pair”, and as a tight player, you’ve shown a tendency to at least have the highest card on the board in raising situations

    4. A flush draw just completed, which is yet another way their hand could be beat.When you add up all the facts, the benefits of folding outweigh the risks of calling, and since your story seems believable, your opponent decides to lay his hand down, and you drag the pot.

So to summarize, equally as imporant as how you bluff is the times you choose to do so. Think about these things, and whether or not the bluffs you tend to make do, in fact, make any sense at all. Before you think about pulling the trigger, make sure all the facts line up. Then and only then will you begin to see the true value in storytelling.

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2008 WSOP $10,000 NLHE World Championship Day 6: Dennis Phillips Leads Final 27

(PN) On July 3rd, the WSOP $10,000 No-Limit Hold’em World Championship began with 6,844 players. Ten days later, only 79 players remained, all focused on the coveted bracelet and $9,111,517 first prize seemingly within their grasp. While the payouts crossed the six-figure mark for the first time in the tournament, it was a double-edged consolation prize for all those that made it so deep into the second largest WSOP event in history.

At the end of Day 6 only 27 players remained, with Dennis Phillips holding a slight chip lead over Craig Marquis. Phillips won his seat into the Main Event through a satellite held at Harrah’s Casino in his home town of St. Louis. At age 53, he is the oldest player of the final 27, which is heavily populated by 20-something year-olds. Craig “craigmarq” Marquis, in second place, more closely represents the demographic of the remaining players; Marquis is 23, a college student, and an online player. And while the third-place player is also young, she represents a rare demographic so deep in the WSOP Championship Event. Tiffany Michelle is the last woman remaining in the field. To date, Barbara Enright is the only woman to make the WSOP Championship final table, finishing in fifth place in 1995. More than ten year later, Tiffany Michelle will get her shot at a poker history-making finish.

The worst hand in poker was responsible for the first elimination in Day 6. All the money went in on an 8-6-2 flop, with Bob Whalen holding pocket jacks to David “Chino” Rheem’s 7-2, known as “the hammer.” A seven came on the turn to give Rheem two pair, and Whalen couldn’t catch up; Whalen was eliminated in 79th place. Rheem mused, “Sometimes when you get your hand caught in the cookie jar, you get a cookie. Most of the time you get your hand smacked.” Matt Matros sealed his tenth lifetime cash in a WSOP event, finishing in 78th place when his A-7 couldn’t overtake David Saab’s pocket threes. And Mark Wilds scored his 19th WSOP lifetime money finish, coming in 77th when his pocket eights went up against Darus Suharto’s pocket nines.

Lisa Parsons put the last of her chips in the middle with pocket jacks, only to run into Owen Crowe’s pocket aces. Parsons’ finished in 76th place and left Tiffany Michelle to represent for women. David Benefield had the best of it when all his money went in on the turn. With the board reading (10-Clubs)(9-Clubs)(8-Hearts)(7-Clubs), Benefield flipped over (K-Hearts)(J-Hearts) for the jack-high straight. Brandon Cantu turned over (A-Clubs)(9-Hearts) for a pair and nut flush draw. The (6-Clubs) on the river completed Cantu’s flush and David Benefield finished in 73rd place.

Irish player James McManus got all his money in on an open-ended straight draw against Andrew Rosskamm’s pocket aces. McManus failed to connect and finished in 71st place. Victor Ramdin finally lost his battle with a short stack, getting his chips in with (A-Hearts)(3-Hearts) against Garrett Beckman’s pocket jacks. Both players liked the (K-Clubs)(J-Hearts)(5-Hearts) flop, Ramdin with the nut flush draw and Beckman with a set of jacks. But when the board paired a five on the turn, only Beckman was pleased. Victor Ramdin has many WSOP event cashes and has grossed well over $2 million in tournament play. Surprisingly this was Ramdin’s best WSOP money finish, providing $96,500 for his 64th-place finish.

WSOP bracelet winner Thomas Keller was eliminated in 61st place when his small stack and K-Q fell to Jeremy Joseph’s 7-6 when a six hit the board. Jeremy Joseph held the lead at various stages of the Championship event, but also became a Day 6 victim. Joseph pushed in with pocket fives which failed against Gert Andersen’s pocket jacks. Joseph finished in 57th place.

WSOP Academy instructor Alex Outhred’s run ended in a race between his A-K and Chris Klodnicki’s pocket nines. While a king fell on the flop, so did a nine. Outhred finished in 54th place. Sometimes the mantle of chip leader is a curse, or at least that may be how Mark Ketteringham looks back on Day 6. Ketteringham started Day 6 with the lead, but ran into nothing but trouble all day. He pushed his remaining 590,000 chips in with J-8 and Gert Andersen called with A-Q. A queen on the board sealed it for Andersen and Ketterinham was eliminated in 52nd place.

Phil Hellmuth was able to negotiate his way out of a one-orbit penalty levied as Day 5 ended, but wasn’t able to negotiate his way out of a Day 6 elimination. Hellmuth was levied a penalty in the waning hours of Day 5 which was to begin at the start of Day 6. After meeting with Jack Effel, WSOP Tournament Director, Howard Greenbaum, Harrah’s Regional Vice President for Specialty Gaming, and Jeffrey Pollack, Commissioner of the WSOP, Hellmuth was able to get the penalty reversed on grounds that it was “too excessive.”

Hellmuth seesawed with a relatively short stack, but finally was eliminated in 45th place when his A-Q failed to overtake Andrew Rosskamm’s pocket jacks. Kido Pham’s day would also end against pocket jacks, when his A-K lost out. Pham finished in 41st place.

Mike Matusow made the WSOP Championship final table in 2001 and 2005. But Matusow’s bid for another ended with a three-out heartbreaker that put him out in 30th place. Just before the last break of the day, both Matusow and Paul Snead checked the A-A-5 flop. All the money went in on the nine turn. Matusow flipped over A-J for trip aces, but Snead had overtaken him with a boat on the turn with A-9. A king fell on the river and Matusow’s run was over.

Nicholas Sliwinski and Nikolay Losev sparred all night long, but their battle ended when Nikolay Losev made the decision to call his short stack in with two live cards. Losev’s (3-Hearts)(8-Hearts) failed to overtake Sliwinski’s A-5 and Losev became the last elimination of Day 6, finishing in 27th place.

Day 7 will determine the 2008 Championship final table. It will also be the last day of the “summer” series as the actual final table play will be delayed until November 9th and 10th. How will poker’s summer end? Check back with the PokerNews “Live Reporting” team for all Day 7 action.

Day 6 Chip Counts:

Dennis Phillips 11,910,000
Craig Marquis 11,460,000
Tiffany Michelle 9,755,000
Peter Eastgate 9,325,000
Kelly Kim 8,840,000

David ‘Chino’ Rheem 8,280,000
Gert Andersen 6,740,000
Paul Snead 6,600,000
Chris Klodnicki 6,245,000
Toni Judet 5,000,000

Ivan Demidov 4,965,000
Nicholas Sliwinski 4,925,000
Joe Bishop 4,855,000
Brandon Cantu 4,740,000
Darus Suharto 4,510,000

Scott Montgomery 4,320,000
Owen ‘ocrowe’ Crowe 3,800,000
Albert Kim 3,675,000
Ylon Schwartz 3,655,000
Jason Riesenberg 3,405,000

Anthony Scherer 2,385,000
Dean Hamrick 2,375,000
Tim Loecke 2,280,000
Aaron Gordon 1,790,000
Niklas Flisberg 1,330,000

Phi Nguyen 1,020,000
Michael Carroll 1,015,000

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A Note on Notes, by DntCaltACmBk

6:04am: This is a very informative article written by Corey (aka “DntCaltACmBk”) regarding note taking in heads up sit n gos. While I personally don’t take advantage of the luxury of being able to take notes as much as I probably should, this article explains why it’s important.

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Throughout the grind of heads up sit & go’s I have picked up a lot of useful skills that aided me in my Sharkscope graph exploding. Note taking was one of them. I do get the opportunity to play the same people multiple times so of course the notes help in that respect – but for me, note taking is mostly about helping me to focus and observe my opponent’s tendencies.

The number one piece of advice that I could share – the one thing that I absolutely know to be true and useful, that I’ve known even before I was a winning player – is that you should be looking to put your opponent into a category as soon as possible. Even if it’s in the first two hands, identify him or her – TAG, LAG, weak-tight, weak-loose, whatever… just categorize him/her! You might not be correct, but much like the testing follows the hypothesis in the scientific method, as does you trying out your opponent. Adjust your play to match the type of player you THINK you are dealing with. If you’re running over the guy, you know you’re right. If it’s not working, reconsider your note. By five minutes in you will probably know what type of opponent you have, then you can lock in your note and you’ll have a head start next time you meet as a bonus.

So what should your notes say? I don’t have a formula, in fact most of my notes are kind of goofy. “Calling McCallington from Callville”. “Loose goose”. But mostly I just write “weak-tight”, “LAG, “TAG”. I do get more specific, which I will get to in a second, but I’ve got to tell you the number one note I make…

The number one, most common, probably happens every day note is…. “weak for weak”. What I’m telling myself is that my opponent bets weak with his weak hands. Think about how beneficial that information is. It almost always holds true too. Most opponents marked with “weak for weak” are accompanied by a note right next to it that says “strong for strong”.

Beyond the one word, one line notes I do sometimes get more specific. This often happens if I am having difficulty categorizing my opponent but I need to keep observing and keep giving myself information. It can also be if I just feel like giving myself as much information as possible. Sometimes a “LAG” note is not enough, if this guy is just a maniac the more ways I can express that in my notes the more I will be prepared next time and know how to close the deal this time. So if a note worthy hand takes place I’ll take it down. Just before I wrote this article, for example, I had to write “Overbet pot huge with bottom pair when I raised pre”. That tells me what kind of player he is, doesn’t it?

Finally, a common note for me is writing down how my opponent likely views me. If I keep getting caught making bad plays or bluffs, maybe my opponent thinks I’m a LAG donk – hey, maybe that’s the note he has on me! So I make a note of it. Another match I had just before this article: I put myself in my opponent’s shoes and it appeared that I was a fairly ABC obvious poker player. This allowed me to steal some nice pots and probably forced him to make some big folds.

Note taking really isn’t about the next time – the next time is good, but you want to win now. Taking good notes means that you are observing, that you are thinking – and especially if you can take notes on how your opponent views you, that kind of critical thinking is bound to improve your game. So take your notes and remember, for when those rematches do come up, it is nice to leave little notes for yourself. I like to write “Dear Corey of the Future, This is the easiest donk in the world. If you lose you should quit at life. Your pal, Corey of the Past.”

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Session Results: 4-0; Article on Bluffing Later Today

4:05am: Well, with the exception of one of my opponents, today was rather easy. I’ve been slowly grinding upward after my 1-5 showing the other night, but today was the exact opposite of a grind as I picked up nearly $400 after knocking off my first four opponents of the night. I decided to reward myself and leave it at that, and I will put in a higher volume session later today.

For the most part today, my opponents were weak-tight, and on top of that I ran pretty good. In one of my matches, I was actually behind when my opponent was all in with 55 vs. his JJ. The flop instantly changed things when 5 9 9 rolled out, which in turn sealed the victory and the match for me. The last match consisted of me taking a BUNCH of pots off of a guy who assumed I only played the nuts. Which brings me to my next point of interest…

In the works for today is a pretty in depth article analyzing the “bluff” in heads up sit n gos, and it’s place in the highly psychological affair that is the heads up sit n go. I’m sure a lot of you wonder how much I actually bluff, having seen my videos and such.

To answer that question, it’s definitely a lot more than you think. There’s no way I could expect to keep such a consistently upward slope, even in the higher-middle stakes by just playing “ABC poker”. Look for that article later on today.

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